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Abstract T h eH u m a nG e n o m eP r o j e c t( H G P )i s
regarded by many as one of the major scientific
achievements in recent science history, a large-scale
endeavour that is changing the way in which
biomedical research is done and expected, moreover,
to yield considerable benefit for society. Thus, since
the completion of the human genome sequencing
effort, a debate has emerged over the question
whether this effort merits to be awarded a Nobel
Prize and if so, who should be the one(s) to receive it,
as (according to current procedures) no more than
three individuals can be selected. In this article, the
HGP is taken as a case study to consider the ethical
question to what extent it is still possible, in an era of
big science, of large-scale consortia and global team
work, to acknowledge and reward individual contri-
butions to important breakthroughs in biomedical
fields. Is it still viable to single out individuals for
their decisive contributions in order to reward them in
a fair and convincing way? Whereas the concept of
the Nobel prize as such seems to reflect an archetyp-
ical view of scientists as solitary researchers who, at a
certain point in their careers, make their one decisive
discovery, this vision has proven to be problematic
from the very outset. Already during the first decade
of the Nobel era, Ivan Pavlov was denied the Prize
several times before finally receiving it, on the basis
of the argument that he had been active as a research
manager (a designer and supervisor of research
projects) rather than as a researcher himself. The
question then is whether, in the case of the HGP, a
research effort that involved the contributions of
hundreds or even thousands of researchers worldwide,
itisstillpossibleto“individualise”thePrize?The“HGP
Nobel Prize problem” is regarded as an exemplary issue
in current research ethics, highlighting a number of
quandaries and trends involved in contemporary life
science research practices more broadly.
Keywords HumanGenomeProject.NobelPrize.
Research ethics.Fairnessofrewardmechanism
in biomedical research
...the capital, invested in safe securities by my
executors, shall constitute a fund, the interest on
which shall be annually distributed in the form
of prizes to those who, during the preceding
year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit
on mankind... (excerpt from Alfred Nobel’s will).
We all try, but some succeed (Humphrey Bogart
in Casablanca).
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Introduction: The Century of the Nobel Prize
The first Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, like
those in Chemistry, Physics, Literature and Peace,
was awarded in 1901. Indeed, the twentieth century
can be regarded as the century of the Nobel Prize.
From the very outset, however, Nobel Prizes in
general, and the one in Physiology or Medicine in
particular, have been plagued by what can be referred
to as a basic tension between reality and ideal. By
singling out individual scientists as paragons of
scientific achievement in their fields, the Nobel Prize
seems to endorse the “archetypical” idea of a solitary
researcher making his or her one great discovery or
invention, to the benefit of mankind, as it is stated in
Alfred Nobel’s will. Although from the 1950s
onwards Nobel Prizes in Physiology or Medicine
have usually been awarded to three persons rather
than one, as had been the common rule during
the first half of the century, these three persons
are still usually seen as individual scientific “heavy
weights” working in a more or less independent and
“researcher-driven” fashion, rather than as “science
workers” firmly embedded in extended research net-
works or consortia. Whereas solitude, perseverance,
creativity and flashing insights are bound to remain
basic ingredients of scientific discovery, the archetypi-
cal idea of the scientific hero seems nonetheless
increasingly at odds with the way in which research is
actually conducted. And although (as will be pointed
out below) this basic tension is as old as the Nobel
Prize in Physiology or Medicine itself, it has become
increasingly problematic as the research practices
involved continue to expand in terms of pace, complex-
ity and scale.
This intricate issue can be addressed from various
angles: history of science, sociology of science,
science ethics, etc. In this contribution, I intend to
address it from a normative perspective, as a quandary
of contemporary science ethics, thereby regarding the
awarding of Nobel Prizes first and foremost as a
moral issue. The Nobel Prize is considered by many
as the acme of acknowledgement, and, as Merton and
others have pointed out, acknowledgement (in various
formats, ranging from citations, chairs and appoint-
ments up to international prizes) is crucially important
in science. But as such, it is also likely to be highly
controversial, raising a host of normative issues and
deliberations in terms of transparency and fairness,
both on a general level and with respect to specific
cases. Moreover, by being awarded a Nobel Prize, the
researchers involved are singled out as models or
examples for others, as exemplary scientists setting a
standard, not only in terms of the discoveries or
inventions they actually made, but also in terms of
crucial scientific values they came to embody such as
disinterestedness, reliability, honesty, meticulousness
and the like. Or, to formulate it in a negative vein:
should a Nobel Prize winner be exposed as a
dishonest person and a fraud, science as such would
be in danger of seeing its credibility diminished.
Awarding the Prize on the basis of a particular
achievement, a groundbreaking experiment or publi-
cation, conveys the message that this is how science
ought to be done. And this explains why the Nobel
Prize in Physiology or Medicine has stirred such a
plethora of normative controversies and why the
actual decisions made seem to become increasingly
contested over the years: the awarding of such Prizes
involves more than counting citations or determining
an author’s H-factor. It entails a normative statement
concerning the value and values involved in a highly
dynamical and rapidly evolving phenomenon called
science. The type of considerations for selecting and
evaluating candidates are bound to change as science
develops over time. As “Nobel Prize historian”
Robert Friedman phrases it, “success or failure in
winning [the prize] has not depended upon timeless,
fixed standards of excellence. Rather, the changing
priorities and agendas of committee members, as well
as their comprehension of scientific accomplishment,
have been critical” (2001, ix).
Yet, although my paper will basically take a
science ethics perspective, sociological and historical
analyses are crucially important when it comes to
providing the “input” for a normative assessment.
Ethical considerations have to build and critically
reflect on empirical analyses of how practices of
knowledge production are actually evolving and how
controversies and dilemmas concerning the Nobel
Prize in Physiology or Medicine have actually been
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on a general level, I will focus on a particular case
study, namely the Human Genome Project (HGP).
Should the sequencing of the human genome be
awarded by the Nobel Prize and, if so, who should
be the (one, two or three) persons to receive it? By
focussing on this case study I intend to address in a
concrete manner the more general question: to what
extent can the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine
still be regarded as a fair and convincing mechanism
of reward in an era of anonymity, global networks,
multiple authorship, private−public partnerships and
Big Science.
The Human Genome Project
The HGP will certainly present an interesting but also
a difficult case for Nobel Prize committees to deal
with. The sequencing of the human genome is
regarded by many as one of the major scientific
highlights in recent science history. And it may be
seen as highly symbolic perhaps that the human
genome sequence was published in 2001, exactly
100 years after the first Nobel Prizes were awarded
(International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium
[IHGSC] 2001). Moreover, from the very outset, the
HGP has generated a plethora of claims concerning
the benefits for humankind that are expected to result
from it in terms of health, sustainability and empow-
erment. Thus, from the very start, this project, the final
conclusion as it were of a long journey that began with
the re-discovery of Mendel in 1900 and the disclosure
of the structure by DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953
(Watson and Crick 1953), has raised the question
whether a Nobel prize should be attached to it—not a
regular one, moreover, but rather a kind of mega-Nobel
prize, the Nobel prize of Nobel Prizes, and perhaps
even more than just one. Indeed, a decade of Nobel
Prizes might be expected to flow from it. The history
of the HGP is more or less haunted by this question
and the likelihood that some of its key protagonists
would one day receive a phone call from Stockholm
has been an issue of speculation and dispute on various
occasions. Indeed, protagonists such as Craig Venter
consciously tailored their publication policies so as to
increase the likelihood of one day earning the biggest
prize in science (Shreeve 2004). Moreover, the HGP is
regarded as the “flagship project” of genomics as an
emerging technoscientific field, an endeavour claimed
to have irreversibly and fundamentally changed the
way in which research in the life sciences is done
(Collins et al. 2003). Another important reason for
focussing the discussion on the HGP is that more than
any other recent achievement in science, it exemplifies
the current transformations that are taking place in the
way in which scientific knowledge is produced. The
question basically is what these transformations—this
“scientific revolution” that is clearly connected with
the emergence of Big Science—imply (from a norma-
tive perspective) for the scientific individual. The idea
of a Nobel Prize presupposes that a major scientific
feat can still be meaningfully attributed to the talents
and commitment of one, two or three concrete
individuals at most. The era of Big Science, as
exemplified by the HGP, raises the question to what
extent this presupposition is still feasible.
Big Science
The Big Science concept builds on the scientometric
observation, put forward by De Solla Price (1963) and
others, that there is a tendency in modern research
towards exponential growth, regardless of whether
this refers to the number of researchers, author names,
publications, journals, journal articles, citations or any
other quantitative indicator. As all these indicators
display the tendency to double at regular intervals,
scientific inquiry has by now evolved into a rather
massive phenomenon, and the archetypical image of
the solitary researcher increasingly seems to become
marginalised as a relic from the past. Moreover, the
Big Science concept not only refers to the actual
number of researchers working and collaborating
within a particular field, but also to the increased
dependence of current research on massive, expensive
and sophisticated technologies, as exemplified by the
particle collider at CERN, but also by the automated
sequencing machines of genomics research, involving
large-scale investments and sophisticated manage-
ment structures. Publications in particle physics in
which CERN findings are reported may have several
hundred authors, and biology is now moving in the
same direction with the advent of the industrial-scale
work required for sequencing genomes (Bishop
2003). As the number of individuals responsible
for single breakthroughs in scientific research has
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limit of three recipients for each prize may be too
restrictive. Whereas most discoveries in modern
science arise from the efforts of multiple individu-
als, no more than three individuals can receive the
prize in each category. In fact, the current limit of
three for each prize is itself a compromise, represent-
ing a revision of Nobel’s original bequest, which
speaks of only one recipient per prize. Might the
Nobel Foundation now be tempted to make the awards
even more inclusive? The Nobel Foundation does
not seem inclined to move in this direction (Bishop
2003,2 4 ) .
In what manner does the emergence of Big Science
undermine the credibility of policies of individual
recognition as such? In this paper I will argue that, as
we experience a period of increase in scale and pace,
of globalisation of scientific effort, individual
researchers increasingly tend to operate in the context
of massive knowledge networks. They have become
anonymous rather than autonomous. Yet, this does not
mean that the ethical dimension of individual com-
mitment is being erased altogether, quite the contrary.
Rather, I see it as a challenge for contemporary
science ethics to address the novel ethical problems
and dilemmas arising in such complex, competitive
and large-scale research environments in a convincing
way (Zwart 2008a). This implies that, besides
traditional values such as autonomy and perseverance
in the face of adverse external pressures, academic
excellence must increasingly involve other virtues and
values as well, such as transparency, fairness and a
communicative attitude towards the outside world.
And the Nobel Prize, as a highly visible mechanism
of acknowledgement in science, should reflect and
acknowledge this. But before turning to the present,
allow me to briefly browse through the Nobel Prize
archives to see how this dilemma has been dealt with
in the past.
A Century of Nobel Prizes: From Ivan Pavlov
to the HGP
The responsibility for awarding the Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine lies with the Karolinska
Institute in Stockholm, but the details of nomination,
evaluation and selection are a well preserved secret
(Feldman 2000). The statutes of the Nobel Foundation
provide for strict secrecy and minutes from Committee
meetings are non-existent, but we may still get to know
something every now and then (http://nobelprize.org;
Friedman 2001). Letters of correspondence and all
letters of nomination since 1901 are kept in the
committee’s archive, while reports from the commit-
tee’s advisers have been printed in separate internal
volumes for each decade. After 50 years the Director
of the Norwegian Nobel Institute may give access to
these archival sources, primarily for the purpose of
historical research. In 1976, for instance, the Nobel
Foundation opened its archives to researchers up to the
year 1950 (Friedman 2001).
These intriguing files and sources indicate that the
tension outlined above has been haunting Nobel Prize
procedures from the very start, as exemplified by the
case of the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov. In four
successive years (1901, 1902, 1903, 1904) Pavlov
was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Physiology
or Medicine, and each time the award committee
confronted the same question: to what extent were the
products of Pavlov’s laboratory truly Pavlov’s? The
nominee had himself pronounced that his most
substantial work, Lectures on the Work of the Main
Digestive Glands (1897), was the achievement of his
entire laboratory. He had credited his co-workers for
conducting the experiments on which it was based.
Furthermore, he referred readers seeking evidence
for his arguments to their publications. Did Pavlov’s
major work, on which his nomination was based,
represent his own original contributions to science, or
was it merely a “compilation of the experimental
dissertations?” (Todes 2002, xiii). Apparently endors-
ing the archetypical image of the scientist as a heroic
lone investigator, the Nobel Prize Committee was
now confronted with a more or less novel and
apparently somewhat aberrant form of scientific
knowledge production. Pavlov was actually a research
manager rather than a solitary researcher, and his
laboratory was a “factory,” producing series of
knowledge claims in a systematic fashion, constitut-
ing something of a knowledge production line, rather
than a small-scale “workshop.” Although Pavlov
designed most of the trials and presented the research
results in books, papers and lectures, the actual
experiments were conducted by the “praktikanti”
working in Pavlov’s research facilities, hoping to
complete their medical education in this manner.
Nonetheless, in 1904, the prize finally was awarded
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romantic image of the researcher as an individual,
about to make his one key discovery, his highly
personal contribution to the benefit of mankind, and
the way in which scientific knowledge claims came to
be produced by academic professionals in the course
of the twentieth century, is bound to increase even
further with the emergence of big science as exem-
plified by the HGP.
Indeed, one century later,in2000and 2001,a similar
dilemma presented itself, but on an even grander
scale. On June 26 2000, President Clinton, together
with Francis Collins (Director of the International
Human Genome Sequencing Consortium) and Craig
Venter (his self-proclaimed rival, representing the
privately owned Celera Company), announced at a
press conference that the massive effort to sequence
the human genome was reaching its completion. In
2001, both teams published their results in a co-
ordinated fashion, through milestone articles in Nature
and Science respectively (IHGSC 2001, Venter et al.
2001). Collins’ version listed 249 “authors”, and
Venter’s publication 285. These very numbers already
indicate that Big Science as a phenomenon had
reached the life sciences by now. As indicated above,
CERN publications in the field of high energy physics
already display such tendencies towards multiple
authorship, but for the life sciences, where the bulk
of academic research still tended to be conducted
on the basis of individual research grants, this was
something of a novelty. Both the press conference and
the two key publications significantly fuelled the
debate over the question whether this achievement
shouldmerit a Nobel Prize and, morecomplicated even,
who should be the person or persons to receive it?
Shortly after the Nature publication, at a follow-
up press conference in San Francisco organised
during a meeting of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) on February 18
2001, Francis Collins was explicitly asked whether
the sequencing of the human genome warranted the
Nobel Prize. In his (now famous) reply he stated that
it would have to be given to 3,492 people to properly
recognize everyone who had significantly contributed
to this common effort (Davies 2002, 266). This
attitude of humility and collectivism was already
conveyed by the opening pages of the Nature
publication itself, where Collins was listed simply
as one author among many, allowing his colleague
Eric Lander (who in fact had done most of the actual
writing) to be the first name on the list. In the case of
Venter, things were slightly different. He put his own
name first and at various occasions explicitly
considered the likelihood that some of his highly
cited key publications, notably the one on the
human genome, might bring him the Nobel Prize
some day. Both Collins and Venter, however, have
subsequently published memoirs containing exten-
sive reflections on their human genome years (Collins
2006,V e n t e r2007) and both documents make it
abundantly clear how problematic it would be to
give credit for the human genome sequencing effort
to one, two or three individuals only. Although at
crucial moments individual initiatives, personalities
and eureka-like experiences of enlightenment remain
undoubtedly important, life science research in the
genomics era as such has irrevocably grown into a
large-scale, collective endeavour.
If a Nobel Prize is to be awarded for deciphering
the human genome, therefore, it is difficult to see how
this can be done in a manner that is both meaningful
and fair. As Robert Cook-Deegan phrases it: “the
final truth is that no individual can take full credit”
(1995, 71). Moreover, he argues that Nobel selection
committees are “perpetually unfair” in conferring a
prize on “winners” in science—ignoring the way
science has changed so that most major advances
require the efforts of hundreds of researchers, not one
or two (ibid.). We seem to be faced with a real dilemma.
On the one hand, when it comes to awarding the Nobel
Prize somewhere in the near future, the human genome
sequencing effort seems impossible to ignore. On the
other hand it seems equally impossible to single out
evenalimitednumberofrecipientsinaconvincingway.
Each possible selection promises to be highly contro-
versial. It appears to be an impossible task from the
very outset.
What does this imply for the Nobel Prize as a
reward mechanism in science? Since Merton we are
familiar with the idea that scientists are much more
interested in symbolic expressions of acknowledgement
than in more mundane forms of reimbursement such as
money. In order to “organize” acknowledgement,
moreover, a number of mechanisms have been put in
place such as citation indices, invited lectures, Nature
covers and, at the very summit of the acknowledge-
ment pyramid, the Nobel Prize. Yet, some of these
acknowledgement mechanisms apparently stem from
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Nobel’s bequest, spelled out in a single handwritten
paragraph, seems to convey the idea of solitary
researchers who, at a certain point during their long
journey, have this one grand idea that will not only
further science, but will also bring significant benefits
to society. And indeed, discoveries of this type have
existed and will no doubt continue to exist. The
discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and
Crick may to a certain extent be seen in this manner,
namely as a key discovery attributable to discrete
individuals who embarked on a research effort of their
own design. Although even in this case the role of co-
discoverers incited much controversy, notably the
question of whether the role of Rosalind Franklin had
been duly acknowledged, the consensus gradually
seems to have emerged that, although the work of
Chargaff, Franklin and others had been pivotally
important, Watson and Crick were nonetheless the
ones who, at the crucial moment, choose the right track
and made the final decisive steps (Maddox 2002). Yet,
the overall picture seems to be that the tension between
the basic image to which the Nobel Prize still tends to
adhere and the actual practices of knowledge produc-
tion as they currently evolve, continues to increase.
Mechanisms of Acknowledgement
This tension causes similar problems of course for
other mechanisms of acknowledgement as well, such
as citation indices (Wouters 1999, cf. Zwart 2005). Is
the academic citation culture fair? Does it reflect the
value of contributions in a meaningful way? Can a
citation index be regarded as a reliable indicator when
it comes to assessing the academic quality and impact
of individuals or research groups? Robert Merton
himself emphasized the lack of fairness in citation
practices when he described what he referred to as the
Matthew effect in science (Merton 1988, cf. Zwart
2005, 78). This concept builds on a famous saying
borrowed from the Gospels: “For unto everyone that
hath shall be given, and he shall have in abundance;
but from him that hath not shall be taken away even
what he hath” (Mt 13:12). In contemporary language:
those of us who “have” are bound to receive even
more, while the have-nots will become even more
deprived. In terms of citation indices this means that
most articles published by scientists will be cited
only a few times, and then they will be forgotten
completely, as if they had never been written. Indeed,
most authors will be read and cited by only a limited
number of readers, and eventually they will be ignored
more or less for ever. Some articles, however, will be
cited more often and the number of citations may even
reach a certain critical limit. Beyond that point, the
number of citations is bound to increase dramatically
and exponentially. These publications will receive
hundreds or even thousands of citations. Colleagues
will continue to cite them for 20 or 30 years, until the
paradigm to which the publication belongs expires.
Thus, a limited number of authors may publish articles
that really allow them to make their name, although
the time and effort spent on writing them may not
significantly exceed the amount of time and effort spent
on publications that are treated less respectfully.
Various factors may contribute to the success rate
of a particular paper. Eponymy is a well-known factor
(Merton 1957/1973). If you want to become academ-
ically famous, invent a concept, a test, or identify a
new disease to which your name may become
attached. Although in the case of eponymy authorship
is highly “functional”—simply a convenient way for
referring to tests, concepts, illnesses or bodily parts—
it works. Hardly anyone who refers to the Stroop test
or Stroop effect nowadays, will know anything about
the individual bearing the surname Stroop. Hardly
anyone will really have read his publication (Stroop
1935). Yet, his impact factor must be astounding.
The Role of the Individual in Contemporary
Science: From Autonomy to Anonymity
and Beyond
When it comes to defining the contribution made by
individual scientists to progress in science, a series of
trends can be identified. Initially, individuality was
the focus of attention. Historians and other scholars
studying science tended to see scientific progress as
the achievement of a limited number of “heroes
of science,” a mere handful of “great men.” An
exemplification of this genre is the book Groβe
Männer, published by Nobel Prize winner Wilhelm
Ostwald in 1909. The author was an outstanding
physical chemist who, later in life, became interested
in the history of his field. In this book he describes
and analyses the life stories of six prominent scientists
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Ostwald explicitly states that, although examples of
female researchers such as Madame Curie do exist,
they are the exception to the rule—the rule being that,
basically, scientific research is the work of a limited
number of very great men.
Another interesting example is Paul de Kruif’s
bestseller The Microbe Hunters published in 1927 and
devoted to scientific heroes such as Louis Pasteur and
Robert Koch—the latter received the Nobel Prize in
1905,whereas theformerdiedin1895,sixyearsbefore
the Nobel Prizes began to be awarded. Paul de Kruif
was “America’s first great science writer” (Henig
2002). Born in 1890, he was trained as a bacteriol-
ogist. He published on streptococci and worked at the
Rockefeller Institute until he was fired after publishing
an anonymous, critical review of contemporary medical
research. He was co-author, but not duly acknowledged
assuch,ofSinclairLewis’ novel Arrowsmith,p u b l i s h e d
in 1925, about a research institute clearly modelled
after the Rockefeller Institute. Critics sometimes
argue that in his narratives De Kruif relied too
much on his imagination and enthusiasm for
science, but two successful Hollywood movies and
one successful Broadway play were based on
Microbe Hunters, his most famous book. De Kruif’s
lively and readable account presents a rather sup-
portive and protagonist-oriented portrayal of scien-
tists as heroes, emphatically emphasizing the
dramatic element inherent in experimental inquiry
(Zwart 2004). Alfred Nobel’s will, although extremely
concise compared to the publications by Ostwald and
De Kruif, seems to convey a similar view on progress
in science: it is the epoch-making work of outstanding
individuals who, because of one decisive feat that
actually represents a life of tenacious effort, manage to
contribute significantly and exceptionally to human
knowledge and wellbeing.
From the 1970s and 1980s onwards, after the
decline of existentialism so to speak, scepticism
concerning the role of individual heroes quickly
began to spread. Within the domain of science studies
(broadly defined) there has been a conscious shift
away from studying the work of individual scientists
towards analysing networks, discourses and structures
(Shortland and Yeo 1996). Science was no longer seen
as the achievement of a limited number of “great men”
(Lenard 1933). Rather, knowledge claims were now
regarded as being produced by networks of more or
less anonymous actors, so that any desire to focus
on prominent individuals tended to be regarded with
suspicion. This trend is exemplified by Bruno Latour’s
monograph entitled “The Pasteurisation of France”
(1984/1988), which has been referred to as a Hamlet
without Hamlet, since the hero whose name is referred
to in the title is virtually absent in the book (Shortland
and Yeo 1996). Science studies seemed to proclaim
what Michel Foucault referred to as the “death” of
the author-as-an-individual. According to Foucault, the
history of scientific authorship displays a definite
shift away from grand authoritative names (such as
“Aristotle”) as indices of genius and truth towards a
purely functional form of authorship, where an
author’s name predominantly serves as, for instance,
a search item in the context of information retrieval in
PubMed and similar sources. And insofar authorship
has become merely functional, various reward mech-
anisms, even Nobel Prizes, may perhaps be seen as
predominantly functional as well, as techniques
employed in the context of performance assessment
of research groups or universities. Moreover, a Nobel
Prize may come to play a “political” function as well.
Awarding the Prize to someone like James Watson
then means that the scientific establishment in place
actually promotes a particular interpretation of what
the biomedical life sciences are (namely that they
should be regarded as more or less identical with
molecular biology), at the expense of other possible
interpretations. And indeed, Nobel laureates such as
Watson are very powerful figures in science, deploying
laureate status and other achievements to assume
pivotal roles in processes of agenda-setting, Watson
for instance in his role as the first director of the HGP
(as Collins’ predecessor).
Although it is important, of course, to be aware of
the pitfalls of hero worship in science, and although
the social and political dimensions of science (the
structures, networks, institutions and power plays
involved) are crucially important when it comes to
understanding science as a real-life phenomenon, I
believe that time has come to reconsider and re-
acknowledge the role played by the individual in
scientific research. If we want to understand and
assess the dynamics of scientific progress, attention
should be paid to the micro-level, the level of individual
activity as well (Zwart 2008b). After focussing on
scientists as heroes (at the expense of social context),
and after subsequently dismissing the individual
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a more sociological, structural or science politics
approach), I would like to argue that it is important
to pay due attention again to the dimension of
individuality as well, notably when it comes to
addressing issues of normativity. To phrase it in a
Foucauldian manner: science must be studied not on
the level of science politics or epistemic communities
only, but also on the level of the Self. The individual is
the place where transformations of knowledge produc-
tion become lively and concrete. How do individuals
position themselves as responsible agents in the face of
major transformations in knowledge production and
technoscientific change?
In other words, what I advocate is not a reframing
of science ethics in accordance with the archetypical
image of the solitary researcher as a hero, whose
heroism notably resides in his willingness to stub-
bornly oppose (rather than interactively endorse) the
forces of collectivism. Quite the contrary, the emer-
gence of Big Science has irrevocably reinforced the
shift from “researcher-driven” research, conducted by
autonomous, more or less free-floating individuals, to
top-down programmatic efforts involving relatively
large numbers of (more or less anonymous) science
workers. This basic shift, from autonomy to anonym-
ity, challenges and changes the meaning of research in
general and of scientific authorship in particular, but
does not erase the dimension of the individual Self
altogether. To further elaborate this issue, I will build
on a line of thinking that is often somewhat neglected
in mainstream science ethics, namely the type of
thinking about research and normativity exemplified
by authors such as Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and
Sloterdijk. Nietzsche, for instance, whose talent for
anticipation can hardly be questioned, already dis-
cerned that normal modern science is bound to entail
the replacement of exceptional heroes by armies of
anonymous individuals (1980, § 547). According to
Nietzsche, however, a true scientist will endorse
rather than deplore this anonymity as inevitable. For
Nietzsche, a true scientist is not only someone who is
willing to put his theories to the test, remaining
susceptible to criticism, continuously on the alert not
to deceive himself; for Nietzsche, the most important
scientific virtue of all is self-denial. He sums this up
in the simple phrase Was liegt an mir! It is not me that
counts! For Nietzsche, this phrase articulates the core
of the scientific ethos, the quintessence of being “in
science” (1980, § 547). His view was taken up many
years later by Michel Foucault who articulated his
own version of the same idea: “Qu’importe qui
parle?” For Foucault, the most fundamental ethical
principle of contemporary scientific discourse resides
in a basic indifference towards the issue of authorship
(1994, 789; Cf. Zwart 2001). Science is, first and
foremost, a discursive phenomenon in which author
names serve as functional tools, notably in the context
of information retrieval as we have seen. In normal
science, academic authorship comes very close to
anonymity, and there is a certain moral quality in the
stoical acceptance of this fact. And indeed, it is in this
vein that many Nobel laureates have written in
retrospect about their Prize. J. Michael Bishop’s
How to win the Nobel Prize may serve as an example
here, conveying a basic attitude of unobtrusiveness,
for instance in the following sentences inserted right
at the beginning of his account: “I felt less than fully
deserving, because the discovery for which Harold
[Varmus] and I were being honored was only in modest
part of my own making…” etc. (Bishop 2003,3 ) .
Yet, this does not delete the dimension of individ-
uality altogether—far from it. Rather, self-denial or
unobtrusiveness are particular styles or modes for
positioning oneself as a scientific individual. Following
Nietzsche’s lead in this, Foucault (1984, 1994),
Sloterdijk (2010) and others have argued (as Nietzsche
already did in more or less similar terms) that scientific
research may be regarded as a kind of “practice of the
Self”, a form of moral self-edification for the individ-
uals involved. Through training and intellectual ascet-
icism, scientists gradually transform themselves, not
only into highly reliable sources of information, but
also into pioneers who, in the folds and margins of
established discourse, are able to enter new terrains, to
experiment with new techniques and thus to open up
novel perspectives. Moreover, these authors emphasise
that, although the conditions for scientific research and
academic authorship have clearly changed, the axis of
the Self continues to constitute a pivotal dimension of
discourse production.
In other words, besides self-denial (i.e. the gener-
ous affirmation by scientists of their anonymity and
fundamental dependence on others), there is another
side to seeing scientific research as a “practice of the
Self”, namely the inherent strive towards self-
improvement, the basic will to challenge established
conventions and the readiness to face new dawns.
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achieved by those who, through constant training and
permanent re-education, remain eager and willing to
acquire new vocabularies and skills. Those who see
novel fields as test-beds and experimental settings,
not only in the scientific sense, but also for exploring
new dilemmas and trying out new ways of addressing
normative issues. And this notably applies to science
workers in the current era. Besides the willingness to
learn to use new tools, such as ICT equipment or new
computational techniques, it also implies the willing-
ness to become adept in novel practices and fluent in
novel professional vocabularies.
Important challenges facing scientific individuals
in the Big Science era notably emerge in areas of
management and communication. They must acquire
the skills not only for governance of the Self, in order
to establish themselves as a reliable and meticulous
individual, as was already the case in the era of the
lone scientific individual, but also for the governance
of increasing numbers of academic others. Whereas
traditionally science ethics tended to focus on the
dilemmas of autonomous decision-making processes
byresearchers asindividuals (micro-ethics), the new era
of Big Science calls for an ethic that addresses social
and political dimensions as well (macro-ethics). This
involves important moral values such as responsibility,
procedural fairnessand transparency. Subsequently, one
could argue that, in order to remain in line with these
developments, the Nobel Prize will gradually have to
evolve into a mechanism of acknowledgement for
novel types of excellence, namely the excellence of
scientists who, at a certain point in their career,
successfully transform themselves from outstanding
individual researchers into visible, accountable and
communicative research managers. The question then
remains whether those to whom this applies deserve
to be singled out and credited, while the great
majority of their devoted colleagues are bound to
remain anonymous? Does the desire for individual
acknowledgement still make sense?
Desire for Acknowledgement
In the movie Casablanca there is a famous and
intriguing scene. At a certain point, a hero enters the
room. Humphrey Bogart, albeit with a slightly cynical
undertone in his voice, complements him with his
achievements. The hero, assuming a quasi-humble
posture, replies by saying that he simply tries to make
a contribution, likeso many other peopledo. Humphrey
Bogart then retorts with one of his most famous
one-liners: “We all try, but some succeed.” Although
many individuals are more or less committed, some
individuals happen to make a contribution that is more
decisive than those of others.
In various publications and seminars the French
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan argued that, rather than
money, survival, sexual gratification or big automo-
biles, acknowledgement is what we are really after.
Acknowledgement is our basic desire, fuelling crea-
tivity and perseverance, even under hazardous con-
ditions, and science continues to rely on individuals
who are willing to display this type of behaviour.
Mechanisms of acknowledgement are important ele-
ments in what Lacan refers to as the “symbolic order.”
Symbolic rewards facilitate and consolidate profes-
sional collaboration. In psychoanalysis, the traditional
Freudian idea had been that research is a kind of
“sublimation.” In the face of societal constraints,
individuals at a certain point decide to invest their
libido in activities other than sex and reproduction.
For Freud, however, research remains a detour for
individuals on their way to sexual intercourse and
parenthood, their ultimate destination. Lacan has
reframed this somewhat differently. A high citation
index is an important gratification, a rewarding source
of pleasure in itself. One of the pitfalls for scholars is
what Lacan would refer to as “imaginary” recogni-
tion: acknowledgement by a limited number of close
followers or friends nearby; the kind of recognition
that typifies sectarism. That is why anonymity,
globalisation and quantification are so important
when it comes to defining performance indicators. It
means that we are no longer dependent on the fragile
benevolence (usually based on reciprocity rather than
true merit) of those individuals who happen to
constitute our immediate academic Umwelt. Thus,
recognition is the symbolic bread we as researchers
and scholars live by, and this implies that the Nobel
Prize, rather than having become a ritual devoid of
meaning or a relic from the past, still has to be
taken quite seriously as an acme of symbolic
acknowledgement.
Yet, building on what has been argued above, time
has come to reconsider our basic mechanisms of
acknowledgement in order to determine whether they
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nowadays have to function. Every now and then it is
important to update and, if necessary, adjust our ways
of operationalizing and valuing excellence. Big
Science has incited the emergence of new roles.
Typical lab sites are not the only places where
creativity becomes decisive and grand ideas flash
up. This may also happen at airports and international
conferences, or during board meetings and committee
gatherings. The “big names” in contemporary life
sciences, the pioneers and agenda-setters, the “first
authors” of landmark publications, are often heavily
involved in acquiring large-scale funding and in
management of science. The role of the scientific
research manager has become a pivotal one, not only
in terms of making discoveries and discerning their
importance, but also in assessing and addressing the
complex ethical, political and strategic issues emerg-
ing in contemporary research. Besides a track record
in laboratory research, scientists in positions of
authority must develop new moral virtues besides
the traditional ones connected with bench work, such
as meticulousness, trustworthiness and selflessness. It
is their challenge to become the visionaries of
contemporary science: articulating “thick” views on
what is happening in current research and what this
may imply for our understanding of ourselves and
nature, as well as for societies of the future; developing
seismographic sensitivities towards important trends
and promising developments. They are also the ones in
a position to ensure that, as Alfred Nobel once stated it,
expensive, large-scale research endeavours contribute
sufficiently to the benefit of mankind. In short, science
in the Big Science era has become an activity that is
more complicated even than playing simultaneous
chess. It might be compared to playing a variety of
differentgamesondifferentboardssimultaneously,with
each game having its own standards of excellence, its
own morale. Is has become impossible to assess
scientific performance (or excellence, as the current
jargon calls it) on the basis of a single coherent set of
criteria. This heterogeneity was already present in
Nobel’s will, where both academic excellence and
societal relevance were regarded as important. Nobel
Prizewinnersofthepresentandnearfutureareboundto
excelonanevenbroaderspectrum.Theywillhavetobe
virtuosi of heterogeneity, able to perform outstandingly
in a broad range of complex and controversial settings.
Does the HGP Merit a Nobel Prize?
Let me now apply these considerations to the case
study at hand, the HGP. It is a complicated “file” no
doubt, but also a timely one, given the fact that, “ten
years after” its completion, the subdued debate is now
bound to become “acute” once again. In his one-page
testament, Alfred Nobel stipulated that the funds
involved should go to outstanding research achieve-
ments (“the most important discovery within the
domain of physiology or medicine”) which during
the preceding year had conferred the greatest benefit
on mankind. However, the criterion of promptitude
explicitly mentioned in the bequest (“during the
preceding year”) has been dropped. As a rule, the
Prize is nowadays given to a contribution made
something like a decade before. By this time, the
significance of the contribution has become suffi-
ciently clear. Thus, 2010 would be an opportune year
for a HGP Nobel Prize to be awarded.
Moreover, as was argued above, the HGP exem-
plifies the emergence of Big Science in the life
sciences, with all the ingredients this involves,
ranging from high visibility and lofty societal expect-
ations up to multiple authorship and the intricacies of
private−public funding. Thus, the HGP seems to
constitute a perfect “test case” for the Nobel Prize as
a mechanism of acknowledgment in the era of “big”
life science. Still, if the Nobel Prize committee should
want to reward the HGP with a Nobel Prize, in view
of its scientific and societal significance, how are they
to identify the one, two, or three individuals who
deserve to be singled out, who may be credited for
this achievement?
The first stipulation to consider, no doubt, is
whether the HGP has produced significant benefit
for humankind. From the very outset, the HGP has
been presented as a milestone in the history of both
science and humanity. While the project in its early
days was often compared to landing on the moon, the
societal prospects it opened up were fleshed out in an
increasingly detailed manner as the project continued
to evolve. As Collins told CNN during a famous
interview, it is hard to overstate the importance of
reading “our own instruction book.” Yet, countless
critics have argued that the societal “relevance” of the
HGP is far from clear as yet. Although genomics has
produced an avalanche of bioinformation, concrete
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promises that have been made at various occasions,
such as the claim uttered during the HGP Press
Conference (June 26 2000) that “it is now conceiv-
able that our children’s children will know the term
cancer only as a constellation of stars” (http://www.
genome.gov/10001356). Let us, however, for the sake
of the argument, give the HGP the benefit of the
doubt in this respect, so that we may focus on the key
issue of this article: the extent to which scientific
achievement in the contemporary biosciences, such
as the HGP, can still be meaningfully attributed to
individuals, even if, as was already indicated above,
Nobel Prizes in Physiology or Medicine are now
typically given to three researchers rather than one. I
will argue that, for a number of reasons, a “HGP
Nobel Prize” (in 2010 or so) would still make sense.
But how to select an acceptable and credible set of
candidates?
One source of information concerning track record
and “practices of the Self” of outstanding scientists
are biographies and autobiographies, notably the
latter. In recent years, a stream of autobiographical
accounts has been published concerning the history of
the human genome sequencing effort, such as Collins
(2006), Crick (1988), Hood (2002), Sanger (1988),
Shreeve (2004), Sulston and Ferry (2002/2003),
Venter (2007) and Watson (2000), but the list will
no doubt continue to expand. These are, if anything,
moral documents, devoted to self-assessment, self-
criticism and self-justification. In virtually all of them,
for instance, issues of agency and responsibility are
explicitly addressed. To what extent can individuals
really be seen as authors of their scientific lives, as
autonomous decision-makers? Rather than presenting
themselves as heroes of science, in full control of the
events, even highly visible scientists such as Sulston,
Collins and Venter emphasize (albeit in terms of their
own personal vocabularies) how they see themselves
as team workers, as products even, rather than as
initiators—describing in a lively manner how they,
notably at crucial moments, had the experience of
being “pulled”, “swept” or “driven” by events, the
outcomes of which were often impossible to predict
from an individual perspective. Their autobiographies
describe complex processes of interaction, involving
both intricate social dynamics and individual initia-
tives, and we cannot say that primacy is given to the
latter. The grand efforts these authors were officially
heading are described in terms of unpredictability,
uncontrollability—sheer chaos even—rather than as
exemplifications of top-down, management-driven
“planning and control.” Moreover, after reading the
reminiscences of Sulston, Collins and Venter one is
bound to realize that, although their role was important,
it was limited as well. After reading Venter’sa u t o b i o g -
raphy, for instance, in combination with Shreeve’s
history (2004) of the companies (TIGR and Celera)
he headed, it is clear that in various respects,
researchers like Gene Myers, Mark Adams or Hamilton
Smith were at least as important in terms of decisive
scientific contributions as was Venter himself. Thus,
eventually, individual contributions must become con-
textualized again in a more comprehensive view of
science as team or network work.
Still, I want to argue that, eventually—notwith-
standing the astonishing scale and complexity of
contemporary research efforts, notably in the life-
sciences—individuals can make a difference at times
(notably at crucial moments), and that these decisive
contributions are meaningfully attributable as well.
When Francis Collins was appointed Director of the
HGP in 1993, he already had an impressive track
record as a “gene hunter.” He had made a name for
himself by developing gene-finding methods such as
positional cloning and chromosome jumping, and by
discovering the location of three important disease
genes, namely those responsible for cystic fibrosis,
neurofibromatosis and Huntington’s disease (Collins
et al. 1987). Thus, assessed in terms of more or less
traditional criteria, focusing on single individuals as
researchers, a nomination for the Nobel Prize would
already make sense. Yet, in subsequent stages of his
career, he was willing and able to develop comple-
mentary skills as well, and to excel in other fields.
After successfully taking the lead in the human
genome venture, he was recently appointed as
director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
an acknowledgement of his managerial perfor-
mance. Moreover, he presented series of lectures
on the societal aspects of genomics and significantly
contributed to debates on this issue through interviews
and panel discussions. Thus, besides academic
research papers, he also published or co-authored a
number of influential papers on the prospects of
genomics for society (Collins 1999)—the famous
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will refers.
Or take the case of Craig J. Venter. Much earlier
than most of his competitors, he acknowledged and
understood the importance of automated sequencing
and some of the specific methodologies involved in
this, such as the EST (Expressed Sequence Tags)
t e c h n i q u eh ei n v e n t e d ,in combination with the
notorious whole-genome “shotgun” approach. The
string of genome publications in the 1990s in which
he was highly involved, such as the ones on the EST
technique (Adams et al. 1991) and on the Drosophila
genome sequence (Adams et al. 2000) made him one
of the most highly cited researchers, while the
comparatively small teams he marshaled produced
staggering amounts of bioinformation. And his
publication on the human genome (Venter et al.
2001) was not the end of his career. Rather, he
subsequently set sail in order to sequence the
metagenome of oceanic life forms. As Kevin Davies
(2002) argues, although Venter’s restless ambition and
single-minded opportunism have alienated him from
many of his fellow scientists, his trailblazing accom-
plishments in DNA sequencing over the past decade
justify a Nobel Prize. Besides that, he was a pioneer
in other fields as well, developing new approaches in
science management through private−public partner-
ships and valorization. His well-documented experi-
ences in this realm provide ample material for
reflection, also on the risks and pitfalls involved in
introducing such strategies in science. And finally,
likeCollins,thoughlectures,interviewsand,eventually,
his autobiography, he contributed significantly to
current debates on the societal meaning of genomics
and the HGP and on the implications it has had for our
understanding ofourselves aswellasoflifeonearth.Of
course, he did not do all this single-handedly—he had
an eye for recruiting talent as well as for acquiring
substantial funding. But when it comes to assessing the
HGP, the sometimes-decisive interventions and contri-
butions of individuals such as Collins and Venter are
impossible to ignore.
If we adopt this line of reasoning, however, the
focus is bound to shift from one particular and
definite contribution (“discovery”) to an extended
performance, turning the Nobel Prize into a “lifetime
award.” The Nobel Prize would then be granted not
on the basis of an assessment of a single discovery or
publication, but rather on the basis of a track record, a
whole career, a curriculum vitae that not only involves
laboratory achievements (technoscientific genius), but
managerial and communicational talents and achieve-
ments as well. The problem then remains whether it is
fair and meaningful to single out individuals (rather
than, for instance, institutes or teams) in a time of mass
production of knowledge claims. Before World War II
the Nobel Prize had almost always been awarded to a
single individual. In the more recent past, it has become
standard practice to select three laureates a year. This
already indicates that, as a reward mechanism, the
Nobel Prize acknowledges and reflects the increase of
scale that has taken place in science. Yet, in my view, to
further expand this trend—for instance, by singling out
teams, consortia or institutes rather than individuals
as possible laureates—would be deplorable as a
symptom of anonymisation. As individual effort con-
tinuestobeacrucialelementinthedynamicsofscience,
the acknowledgement of individual achievements
remains important as well. As was argued above, the
Nobel Prize is one element (a highly prestigious and
visible element no doubt) in a complex network of
symbolic “mechanisms of acknowledgement.” As the
complexities of the knowledge production process
continue to increase, the mechanisms involved must
no doubt become more adaptive, differentiated and
sophisticated as well in order to remain meaningful
and effective. This does not imply, however, that
acknowledgement of individual achievement as such
is something of the past. Nobel committees of the
future face a difficult and complicatedtask. Nonetheless,
achievements deserve to be acknowledged, and some
achievements more than others.
If we agree that the human genome sequence effort
still merits an “individual” Nobel Prize, who should
be the laureates? As other candidates such as James
Watson, John Sulston and Hamilton Smith will have
to be dismissed, simply because they have already
been awarded the Nobel Prize for Physiology or
Medicine (and scientists can become a “Physiology or
Medicine” laureate only once in a lifetime), the idea
of a Nobel Prize for Collins and Venter—preferably in
2010—appears a plausible one, on the basis of their
measurable and quantifiable performance. A Nobel
Prize for Collins and Venter would underline that
over and above being excellent researchers earlier in
their careers, these individuals became outstanding
research managers somewhat later in their lives. And
these management responsibilities involved not only
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address the complex societal issues involved and to
effectively deliberate these issues with policy makers,
politicians, entrepreneurs, journalists and the public at
large. Moreover, to the extent that individuals such
as Collins and Venter are acknowledged for their
exceptional merits as research managers, their Nobel
Prizes will be indirectly awarded to the teams they
represent, thereby acknowledging the less visible
geniuses whom they recruited to work behind the
scenes.
When it comes to awarding the Nobel Prize to
Collins and/or Venter, another hazardous issue will
be to what extent modes of funding should be taken
into consideration. Officially, while Collins headed
the publicly funded sequencing effort, Venter led a
privately owned company with a stock market quota-
tion. As the history of the Nobel Prize reflects the idea
that academic excellence in combination with working
for the benefit of society is somehow incompatible
with striving for personal financial gain, this would
considerably compromise Venter’s chances. Yet, also
in this respect, it has become increasingly difficult
to interpret the world in terms of convenient moral
dichotomies. Contemporary funding policies for aca-
demic research increasingly rely on the emergence of
private−public consortia. Not only the funding strate-
gies, but also the work ethic and the reward systems of
universities and knowledge enterprises have begun to
merge. Even publicly funded research efforts have
become both costly and potentially profitable endeav-
ours. And while Venter at various occasions published
staggering amount of genomics data for free, Watson,
Collins and most of the other protagonists of publicly
funded genomics research privately own patents. Thus,
it will become an increasingly intricate matter to
determine where to convincingly draw the moral line.
Thus, notwithstanding the various complications and
considerations at stake, a Nobel Prize for individuals
such as Collins and Venter would do justice to the way
in which excellent research in the contemporary life-
sciences is done. Eric Lander, first author of the official
Nature presentation of our genome sequence, would
be a convincing “third” candidate to join them.
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